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This paper presents a model of firm investment and financing in which market imperfections 
exist in both real capital and financial capital markets.  Under these conditions the use of 
Tobin’s q to explain investment is examined.  Test results suggest that imperfect markets may 





Early studies of firm investment described the relationship between investment and its 
explanatory variables as a technological phenomenon.  However, for many years research on 
investment has been guided by Tinbergen’s observation that “it is almost a tautology to say that 
investment is governed by profit expectations” (1939, p. 34).  The problem, of course, is that profit 
expectations are very difficult to measure, so what we find among the leading models of investment 
are various proxies for its expected profitability.  Tinbergen believed that for most firms the distant 
future was of little concern, so that realized profit would ordinarily serve as an adequate substitute for 
expected profit. 
 
The role of market value in measuring profit expectations was first described by Greenspan 
(1959) and Grunfeld (1960), in whose models investment varied directly with the market value of the 
firm.  Following the work of Brainard and Tobin (1968), Tobin’s q—the ratio of the market value of 
the firm to the replacement cost of its real capital—supplanted the market value variable as a 
determinant of investment.  Hayashi (1982) showed that under perfect markets assumptions q was a 
sufficient statistic for this purpose. 
 
The application of the q model is based on the proposition that the firm will add to its stock of 
real capital whenever the marginal addition to the market value of the firm’s securities exceeds the 
replacement cost of the real assets they represent.  In practice, secondary markets for real assets are 
often very limited, in which case investment decisions will involve unrecoverable sunk costs.  
Postponing such decisions may have the effect of reducing uncertainty about the profitability of 
investment, so that waiting has a positive value.1  In addition, investment decisions may be constrained 
by financial factors. Under perfect markets, the firm’s investment and financing decisions will be 
independent.2  However, asymmetric information and taxes give rise to a variety of possible outcomes, 
including financial practices intended to mitigate the impact of adverse selection and moral hazard on 
investment.3 
 
1See Bernanke (1983), Dixit and Pindyck (1994), McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Nickell (1978).  Likewise, 
firms may find it optimal to retain excessive capital for some period of time (Bean, 1989). 
2See Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Miller and Modigliani (1961). 
3The importance of financial constraints to investment are described in Blundell, Bond, Devereux and 
Schiantarelli (1992), Bond and Meghir (1994), Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) and Whited (1992). 
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Though widely used in empirical research on investment at both the firm and aggregate level 
over the past twenty years, Tobin’s q has an uneven record. In particular, average q, which is typically 
used in lieu of marginal q (because of a lack of information about the latter), emerges as only one of a 
number of determinants of investment.  In addition, investment appears to be very sensitive to cash 
flow, a finding not predicted by the model.4 Further, estimated coefficients for the q variable imply 
implausibly long periods of adjustment in the capital stock.5  However, these results may arise, not 
because the model is inherently wrong, but because it is not sufficiently robust to capture the various 
conditions under which firms are obliged to operate.  The objective of the present study is to examine 
analytically the impact of market imperfections on the application of Tobin’s q. Firm data will then be 
used to illustrate the importance of including real capital and financial capital market constraints in 
empirical research on investment. 
 
 The Model 
 
The model is based on the stockholder wealth maximization model in which net payments to 
stockholders—that is, dividends—are considered.  In particular, it is assumed that the firm maximizes 
the present value of the future stream of dividends, S: 
 
 dt,e D(t) = S -kto∫
∞  (1) 
 
where D(t) denotes the dividends paid out in period t and k is the equity yield required by investors.6 
 
To simplify the development of the model it is assumed that the firm produces a single good, 
Q(t), at time t, from two homogeneous factors, labour, L(t), and real capital, K(t). The firm sells its 
output at some fixed price, p(t).  Similarly, it purchases its variable factor input, labour, at some fixed 
wage, w(t). Labour services are rented, while the real capital is owned by the firm.  When the stock of 
real capital is not sufficient to provide the quantity of capital services needed for production, the firm 
may acquire additional real capital at its market price.  The quantity of real capital acquired at time t is 
I(t), while its unit price is h(t).  Consequently, expenditure on real capital at time t is h(t)I(t).  Thinness 
in real capital markets is modelled by requiring gross investment in each period to be non-negative; 
that is, I(t) ≥0.7 
 
In addition to the constraint on investment, a financial constraint will be imposed.  In 
particular, dividends will not be allowed to fall below a given threshold.  This is motivated by the view 
that regular dividend payments reduce agency costs at the firm level because managers will be obliged 
to seek external financing and accept the scrutiny of the market when they do so (Easterbrook, 1984).  
4See Blundell, Bond, Devereux and Schiantarelli (1992), Chirinko (1993) and Hayashi and Inoue (1991). 
5The empirical performance of q models is discussed in Blundell, Bond and Meghir (1992), Chirinko (1993) and 
Scaramozzino (1997). 
6The appropriate objective for the firm in the presence of agency costs or asymmetric information is a contentious 
issue.  If there is a divergence of interests between stockholders and managers, the latter will seek to maximize their own 
utility.  However, as explained below, regular dividend payments are used to solve the agency problem between managers 
and stockholders, so that stockholder wealth maximization is the appropriate objective for the firm. 
7This follows Arrow (1968), Bean (1989) and Scaramozzino (1997).  Demers (1991) shows that this constraint 
accounts for a risk premium in the cost of capital. 
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Hence D(t) ≥d, where d is the lower bound on dividends.8 
 
Besides its expenditure on labour and real capital, the firm pays or receives interest on its net 
debt position.  Debt may be positive or negative, depending on whether the firm’s liabilities are greater 
or smaller than its nominal assets. Net outstanding debt at time t is denoted by B(t) and new debt 
incurred by b(t), while i(t) is the cost of borrowing at t.  In order to simplify the development of the 
model it is also assumed that all external funds are obtained through borrowing.9 
 
To summarize, then, the firm will obtain revenue from the sale of its output. From this 
revenue it must pay the owners of the labour stock for services provided, purchase any real capital 
needed to obtain the desired level of capital services, pay interest on its net debt position and adjust its 
borrowing to maintain its investment and dividend plans. Thus, assuming a zero tax rate, dividends are 
identically equal to10 
 
 D ≡ pQ-wL-hI-iB+b-pC(I,K), (2) 
 
where C(I,K) is an adjustment cost function for investment, twice differentiable, with the first 
derivatives and the second own derivatives positive. 
 
The maximization of equation (1) is subject to two technological constraints.  The first is a 
production function specifying the maximum quantity of output obtainable from given inputs of labour 
and capital, L and K, respectively.  In explicit form the function is  
 
 Q(t)=f[K(t),L(t)] (3) 
 
This production function is assumed to be twice differentiable, the first derivatives positive, the second 
own derivatives negative. This implies diminishing marginal returns with respect to any input.  
Further, a positive marginal rate of substitution between inputs is assumed. 
 
The second constraint is a function relating the flow of capital services to the real capital 
owned by the firm.  The geometric mortality distribution, which we shall adopt, has been widely used 
in empirical work, and can be written as follows: 
 
 dK/dt = I-δK, (4) 
 
where δ is the rate of replacement, a fixed constant. 
 
8This assumption includes, as a special case, the condition that dividend payouts be non-negative. 
9One theoretical argument for this assumption is that the market views  new equity issues as conveying negative 
signals about firm profitability (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  However, the empirical relevance of new equity funds appears to 
be very modest.  In the United States, common stock has seldom accounted for more than ten percent of the total value of 
new securities issued by nonfinancial corporations in a given year (Economic Report of the President, various years).  
Moreover, this statistic includes stock sold in initial offerings and that issued in connection with corporate reorganizations, 
business combinations and stock option commitments. 
10The time notation is dropped where no ambiguity occurs. 
The firm is also limited by its borrowing.  Borrowing decisions influence the rate at which 
dividends are paid by affecting the availability of funds. They also influence the rate at which the 
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outstanding debt is changing and thereby the amount of debt that will be outstanding in subsequent 
periods. 
 
In addition, the maximization of equation (1) is subject to initial conditions on the levels of 
real capital and outstanding debt at time 0: K(0)=K0, B(0)=B0.  Consequently, the initial stock of real 
capital and the initial debt position are not variables in the maximization problem.  Labour inputs are 
assumed to be perfectly variable and, as such, adjust to the stock of real capital, K.  
 
 Optimality Conditions 
 
Let us first summarize the problem which the firm is required to solve: 
 
 Max dt,e D(t) = S -kto∫
∞  (5) 
 
where D=pQ-wL-hI-iB+b-pC(I,K), Q=f(K,L) and subject to dK/dt=I-bK,I≥0 and D≥d.  Gross 
investment, I, and new borrowing, b, are the choice variables.  The firm’s problem is to choose I and b 
in each period so that equation (1) is maximized. Only the demand for investment will be considered 
here. 
 
In order to solve this problem we let λ1 be the Lagrange multiplier pertaining to the constraint 
on capital accumulation (equation (4)), and λ2 and λ3 the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers pertaining to the 
inequality constraints on investment (I≥0) and dividends (D≥d).  The first order condition for 
investment can be written as 11 
 
  (6) 
 
Equation (6) relates the firm’s investment decision to the shadow value of capital, λ1, and to the 
shadow costs of the investment constraint, λ2, and the dividend constraint, λ3.  From equation (10), 
and given the linear homogeneity of G(I,K), the investment-capital ratio is a decreasing function of λ3. 
Relaxing the dividend constraint would result in higher investment spending.  When λ2>0, it follows 
from the complementary slackness condition on investment, λ2I=0, and from equation (6) that a higher 
shadow cost attached to the investment constraint must result in a lower shadow value of capital, λ1, or 
in a higher shadow cost of dividends, λ3, or both.  Hence, the investment constraint might reduce the 
attractiveness of capital investment, and exacerbate the opportunity cost of the dividend constraint. 
 




Equation (7) should be estimable because λ1/h is simply Tobin’s marginal q and Hayashi (1982) has 
shown that, under linear homogeneity of the production function and of the adjustment cost function, 
marginal q is equal to average q.  However, if either λ2>0 or λ3>0, or both, then equation (7) provides 
an inadequate description of investment behaviour. 
 
11Allowing external funds to be more costly than internal funds would not alter the first order condition of 
investment.  The firm would issue the smallest amount of debt consistent with the dividend payout requirement.  The 
shadow cost of the latter to the firm, λ3, would be affected.  However, equation (6) would still be satisfied. 
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Estimation also requires an empirically operational adjustment cost function. The appropriate 
choice should be general enough to approximate the actual function in a wide variety of empirical 
situations.  Here we rely on Poterba and Summers (1983) to obtain 
 
 C(I,K)=γ/2K(I/K-µ-ε)2, (8) 
 
where ε is a firm-specific random disturbance and µ is the desired investment-capital adjustment.  The 
first order condition given by equation (6) then becomes 
 
                                  ελλλλγµ +)/h](h/p)h-(+1-/h)[+(1+=I/K 3213
-1  (9) 
 
If λ2=λ3=0, equation (9) simplifies to  
 
 ελγµ +1)(h/p)-/h(+=I/K 1
-1   
 (10) 
 
The q model of equation (10) is only valid when neither the investment nor dividend constraints are 
binding.  Attempts to estimate equation (10) for firms for which λ2>0 or λ3>0, or both, would result in 
a mis-specified model.  The coefficient on the q ratio would be biased, and other variables correlated 
with the shadow values of the constraints would appear to be significant.  In particular, the availability 
of internal funds could reduce the opportunity cost of the dividend constraint.  This could in turn 
exacerbate the investment constraint, given the interdependence of investment and financing policies.  
Measures of cash flow could thus be correlated with the unobservable shadow values λ2 and λ3 in 
equation (9). 
 
Hence the q ratio would only be a sufficient statistic for investment, given the capital stock, 
when neither constraint applies.  Otherwise, estimates of equation (14) will be affected by mis-
specification and may generate implausible coefficients for q as well as allow excess sensitivity to 
financial variables. 
 
 Data Description 
 
In the model outlined above the investment and financing decisions of the firm are inter-
related.  One approach to testing the relevance of the investment and dividend constraints is to 
examine investment behaviour when one or both of the constraints are binding and compare the results 
with those obtained when the constraints do not apply.  The data used for this purpose comprise time 
series data for each of fifty large nonfinancial corporations over the period 1955 to 1994.12  Parallel 
tests were conducted using (estimated) replacement cost and historical cost data to measure capital in 
the denominator of the q variable. The reason for considering historical cost data derives from Booth’s 
(1981) observation that while replacement cost measures are more likely to approximate the economic 
concepts of value, income and cost, managers may not fully appreciate the impact of inflation on the 
firm.  In addition, as explained below, whereas the historical cost data are produced by the firms 
themselves, most of the replacement cost information comprises estimates generated by the author 
using aggregate price indices. 
12The original data set used in this study was compiled for the period 1955-1981.  It was subsequently updated 
with data for the years 1982-1994.  However, in some instances the nature of a firm’s business changed substantially or the 
firm was acquired by another firm.  In these instances the period studied ended in the year preceding the year in which the 
change in business or acquisition occurred. 
                                                 
28th Annual Atlantic Schools of Business Conference 6 
 
Firm data were obtained from the Value Line tapes, successive editions of Moody’s Industrial 
Manual and company annual reports.  The Survey of Current Business and its National Income and 
Product Accounts Supplement provided the data required to compute price indices. Annual data were 
used to measure the variables.  Although quarterly or monthly observations are sometimes employed 
to estimate models of investment, they were not available in the detail that the measurement rules 
employed here required.  In addition, the use of annual data avoided seasonal variations in investment 
expenditures. 
 
The initial criterion employed in selecting individual firms was the availability of (S.E.C. 
(1976) mandated) replacement cost information for 1976 and subsequent years.  Since the S.E.C. 
requirement only applied to firms with inventories and fixed assets totalling more than $100 million 
(at historical cost) and comprising more than ten percent of total assets, the sample may be loosely 
described as comprising large, publicly traded nonfinancial corporations.  In addition, firms were 
chosen from a diverse group of industries and, as a result, have a wide range of investment and 
dividend rates. 
 
For the years prior to 1976 and, in some cases, after 1981, firm-supplied replacement cost data 
were not available.  In order to obtain estimates of firm capital on a replacement cost basis, historical 
cost data were adjusted using an output price index for inventory and a capital goods price index for 
fixed assets.  The details of the adjustments can be obtained from the author. 
 
 Methodology and Results 
 
The model is predicted to provide an appropriate description of firm investment only when the 
shadow costs of the constraints on investment and dividends, λ2 and λ3 respectively, are equal to zero. 
 In order to distinguish those firms for which λ2 >0 or λ3>0 or both from those for which λ2=λ3=0, we 
assume that the constraints are least likely to be binding for those firms with high investment rates and 
dividend payout ratios. The critical threshold used in each case is the median. Utilizing a threshold 
that is well away from the origin reduces the likelihood that high-investment, high-dividend firms 
would have been constrained.  In addition to considering (i) low investment and (ii) low dividend 
payout firms (relative to the median), we also consider the following categories: (iii) low investment or 
low dividend payout; (iv) low investment and high dividend payout; (v) high investment and low 
dividend payout; and (vi) high investment and high dividend payout.  For all categories but the final 
one at least one of the constraints could have been binding.  Only for the final category is equation 
(10) expected to provide an adequate explanation of investment. 
 
In order to estimate equation (10) we use a distributed lag function of the form 
 





∑  (11) 
 
where κt=It/Kt is the investment rate for t, and Kt and qt are beginning of period values.  The choice of 
the current and two immediately past values for qt, with all prior values represented by κt-3, is 
suggested by previous evidence on average project completion times and capital expenditure 
adjustment practices (see Chamberlain and Gordon (1989)). 
 
The regression results for the various cases considered using historical cost data are 
summarized in Table 1.  Columns (i) through (vi) correspond to the six cases identified previously.  
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For each case the number of firms examined, a summary of the numbers of correctly-signed 
coefficients and correctly-signed coefficients significant at the five percent level, and median R2 and 
regression standard error statistics are presented. Columns (i) and (ii) summarize the results for those 
firms for which investment and dividends, respectively, are expected to be constrained.  Generally, the 
q model does not perform well for these groups of firms, with median R2 values of 0.255 and 0.252. 
While approximately five-eighths of the coefficients for qt and qt-1 have the expected positive sign, in 
each case very few are significant at the five percent level. This is in keeping with the possibility that 
there is a positive shadow value attached to the investment constraint (in column (i)) and the dividend 
constraint (in column (ii)). 
 
Though the results are poor, they only consider one constraint at a time.  Hence, in columns 
(iii) to (vi) we consider both constraints jointly, as is implied by equation (10).  Column (iii) presents a 
summary of the regression estimates when at least one constraint could have been binding.  The 
proportion of correctly-signed coefficients, if anything, tends to be slightly smaller 
 
 Table 1 
 
 Estimation Results Summary for Equation (11) 

















































































































































































































*κi  and θi are the mean investment rate and dividend payout ratio, respectively, for firm i, and  κmed and θmed are 
the medians of the mean investment rates and dividend payout ratios for all firms in the category indicated. 
 
than  is the case when only one constraint is considered.  Likewise, very few are statistically 
significant. Columns (iv) and (v) consider the low investment, high dividend and high investment,  
low dividend cases. Again, the q model performs poorly, suggesting that both constraints are 
important.  This inference is also supported by the results for the high investment, high dividend firms 
reported in column (vi).  Here most of the regression coefficients have the correct positive signs.  
While the number of correctly-signed coefficients significant at the five percent level is still small, the 
proportion is consistently higher than for any of the other cases.  Moreover, the median R2 value is a 
relatively high 0.388. 
 
The results obtained using replacement cost data, which are reported in Table 2, generally 
mirror their historical cost counterparts. Cases (i) through (iii) tend to produce correctly-signed 
 
 Table 2 
 
 Estimation Results Summary for Equation (11) 

















































































































































































































*κi  and θi are the mean investment rate and divident payout ratio, respectively, for firm i, and κmed and θmed are 
the medians of the mean investment rates and divident payout ratios for all firms in the category indicated. 
 
coefficients, though, again, few are statistically significant.  As was the case with historical cost data, 
the performance of the model is also poor when only one of the constraints is considered (cases (iv) 
and (v)).  Finally, though less likely to be correctly signed, roughly one-half of those coefficients in 
column (vi) are significant. The median R2 statistic for this case, at 0.356, is also somewhat higher 




The purpose of this paper was to show that the q model is unlikely to provide an adequate 
description of the investment behaviour of firms whose investment and financing practices are 
constrained by imperfect market conditions.  The existence of these constraints may be responsible for 
the mixed results obtained using the q model in previous empirical research on investment.  The use of 
q in the present study to examine the investment behaviour of fifty large nonfinancial corporations also 
appears to support this view.  Interpreting a low investment rate or dividend payout ratio as a proxy for 
a binding constraint on investment or dividends, we find that the model performs poorly when either 
constraint is imposed.  In contrast, the q model works reasonably well for high investment, high 
dividend firms, which are less likely to have been affected by constraints.  At the same time, even in 
the latter case, much of the variation in the dependent variable remains unexplained.  In terms of the 
model presented here, this may be partly because of the inference that the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers for 
the high investment, high dividend firms are equal to zero.  Previous work indicating the importance 
of measures of cash flow suggests the possibility that the availability of internal funds is correlated 
with the unobservable shadow values.  The inclusion of cash flow or other liquidity measures as 
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